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	<title>Comments on: What Is Consciousness? Another Reply to Kastrup</title>
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	<description>Your Daily Fix of Neuroscience, Skepticism, and Critical Thinking</description>
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		<title>By: Eric Thomson</title>
		<link>http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/what-is-consciousness-another-reply-to-kastrup/comment-page-4/#comment-45300</link>
		<dc:creator>Eric Thomson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Sep 2012 14:19:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=4521#comment-45300</guid>
		<description>For those who pressed me to do so in this thread, I have started to address the &quot;Mary&quot; type case in which she starts with zero consciousness knowledge:
http://philosophyofbrains.com/2012/09/01/aliens-versus-materialists.aspx
http://philosophyofbrains.com/2012/09/01/aliens-versus-materialists-part-ii.aspx

It is a good one, and I&#039;m glad people here pushed me to address it, as it is a case that has been on my back burner for some time.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For those who pressed me to do so in this thread, I have started to address the &#8220;Mary&#8221; type case in which she starts with zero consciousness knowledge:<br />
<a href="http://philosophyofbrains.com/2012/09/01/aliens-versus-materialists.aspx" rel="nofollow">http://philosophyofbrains.com/2012/09/01/aliens-versus-materialists.aspx</a><br />
<a href="http://philosophyofbrains.com/2012/09/01/aliens-versus-materialists-part-ii.aspx" rel="nofollow">http://philosophyofbrains.com/2012/09/01/aliens-versus-materialists-part-ii.aspx</a></p>
<p>It is a good one, and I&#8217;m glad people here pushed me to address it, as it is a case that has been on my back burner for some time.</p>
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		<title>By: Eric Thomson</title>
		<link>http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/what-is-consciousness-another-reply-to-kastrup/comment-page-4/#comment-45299</link>
		<dc:creator>Eric Thomson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Sep 2012 14:16:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=4521#comment-45299</guid>
		<description>Paisley: Experiences occur in time, have different rates of occurrence (e.g., flutter of different frequencies when being touched by my vibrating cell phone), and different intensities (just-above threshold tone versus deafeningly loud rock concert). To name three. William James pointed these things out against those 19th century thinkers who claimed that experiences have nothing in common with physical properties. 

What is the mass of a heartbeat, the temperature of bird flight? With consciousness too, we are dealing with complex system-level properties, which often don&#039;t have transparent physical properties.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Paisley: Experiences occur in time, have different rates of occurrence (e.g., flutter of different frequencies when being touched by my vibrating cell phone), and different intensities (just-above threshold tone versus deafeningly loud rock concert). To name three. William James pointed these things out against those 19th century thinkers who claimed that experiences have nothing in common with physical properties. </p>
<p>What is the mass of a heartbeat, the temperature of bird flight? With consciousness too, we are dealing with complex system-level properties, which often don&#8217;t have transparent physical properties.</p>
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		<title>By: Alastair F. Paisley</title>
		<link>http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/what-is-consciousness-another-reply-to-kastrup/comment-page-4/#comment-43868</link>
		<dc:creator>Alastair F. Paisley</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Jun 2012 06:18:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=4521#comment-43868</guid>
		<description>@ evilrobotxoxo

&gt; &lt;i&gt;1) regarding property dualism, it seems to me that it is an empirical matter whether property dualism and substance dualism are actually different positions. I understand that property dualists assert that they are, but that’s based on the premise that it is possible for a physical system to have nonphysical properties, and I’m not sure that’s possible.&lt;/i&gt; &lt;

What are the &lt;a href=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_property&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;physical properties&lt;/a&gt; of consciousness? If you can&#039;t furnish me with any, then you qualify as a property dualist by default.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@ evilrobotxoxo</p>
<p>&gt; <i>1) regarding property dualism, it seems to me that it is an empirical matter whether property dualism and substance dualism are actually different positions. I understand that property dualists assert that they are, but that’s based on the premise that it is possible for a physical system to have nonphysical properties, and I’m not sure that’s possible.</i> &lt;</p>
<p>What are the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_property" rel="nofollow">physical properties</a> of consciousness? If you can&#8217;t furnish me with any, then you qualify as a property dualist by default.</p>
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		<title>By: evilrobotxoxo</title>
		<link>http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/what-is-consciousness-another-reply-to-kastrup/comment-page-4/#comment-43705</link>
		<dc:creator>evilrobotxoxo</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 May 2012 23:36:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=4521#comment-43705</guid>
		<description>A couple of comments/questions from a neuroscientist who is vaguely familiar with basic philosophy of mind:

1) regarding property dualism, it seems to me that it is an empirical matter whether property dualism and substance dualism are actually different positions.  I understand that property dualists assert that they are, but that&#039;s based on the premise that it is possible for a physical system to have nonphysical properties, and I&#039;m not sure that&#039;s possible.  If it is, are there any examples?  It seems to me that the burden of proof is on the property dualists to demonstrate that there are, or else I&#039;m not convinced that they even have a separate position from substance dualists, i.e. ID is to creationism as property dualism is to substance dualism.

2) the whole Mary seeing red argument and other related arguments seem to assume premises that are incompatible with the physicalist position.  Physicalists believe that when a person sees a color, it is a physical process in which a physical particle strikes the retina, setting off more physical processes that lead to an experience that is also a physical process.  In other words, experiencing red is when red photons physically hit you, setting off a chain reaction of physical events.  Similarly, experiencing being shot is when a bullet physically hits you, setting off a chain reaction of physical events through pain-responsive neurons and etc.  Nobody would argue that if Mary was the world&#039;s best trauma surgeon and knew everything there is to know about gunshot wounds, that that means that a bullet would magically appear, lodged in her arm, causing her pain.  But if Mary is a neuroscientist who&#039;s never been hit by a red photon, that&#039;s exactly what dualists argue.  From a physicalist perspective, being hit by a bullet and being hit by a photon are in the same class of phenomena, so I don&#039;t understand how the Mary argument can claim to disprove physicalism.

I&#039;m not an expert in these things, and I know they&#039;re complicated.  I&#039;m open minded to the (likely) possibility that I&#039;m wrong, but if I&#039;m wrong, please explain it to me because no one else has so far.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A couple of comments/questions from a neuroscientist who is vaguely familiar with basic philosophy of mind:</p>
<p>1) regarding property dualism, it seems to me that it is an empirical matter whether property dualism and substance dualism are actually different positions.  I understand that property dualists assert that they are, but that&#8217;s based on the premise that it is possible for a physical system to have nonphysical properties, and I&#8217;m not sure that&#8217;s possible.  If it is, are there any examples?  It seems to me that the burden of proof is on the property dualists to demonstrate that there are, or else I&#8217;m not convinced that they even have a separate position from substance dualists, i.e. ID is to creationism as property dualism is to substance dualism.</p>
<p>2) the whole Mary seeing red argument and other related arguments seem to assume premises that are incompatible with the physicalist position.  Physicalists believe that when a person sees a color, it is a physical process in which a physical particle strikes the retina, setting off more physical processes that lead to an experience that is also a physical process.  In other words, experiencing red is when red photons physically hit you, setting off a chain reaction of physical events.  Similarly, experiencing being shot is when a bullet physically hits you, setting off a chain reaction of physical events through pain-responsive neurons and etc.  Nobody would argue that if Mary was the world&#8217;s best trauma surgeon and knew everything there is to know about gunshot wounds, that that means that a bullet would magically appear, lodged in her arm, causing her pain.  But if Mary is a neuroscientist who&#8217;s never been hit by a red photon, that&#8217;s exactly what dualists argue.  From a physicalist perspective, being hit by a bullet and being hit by a photon are in the same class of phenomena, so I don&#8217;t understand how the Mary argument can claim to disprove physicalism.</p>
<p>I&#8217;m not an expert in these things, and I know they&#8217;re complicated.  I&#8217;m open minded to the (likely) possibility that I&#8217;m wrong, but if I&#8217;m wrong, please explain it to me because no one else has so far.</p>
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		<title>By: rhombusofdoom</title>
		<link>http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/what-is-consciousness-another-reply-to-kastrup/comment-page-4/#comment-43698</link>
		<dc:creator>rhombusofdoom</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 May 2012 17:19:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=4521#comment-43698</guid>
		<description>I think it&#039;s pretty bizarre to assume a non-materialistic world view. Even if you believe in god, ghosts, leprechauns or telepathy.
If god is standing to my left, and a ghost to my right, then something, someTHING, differentiates the space to my left from the space to my right. It may not be a form of matter we can even begin to imagine, but something is different. Nothing is &quot;supernatural&quot;. Nothing can exist without existing. And it&#039;s not necessary, not even to fit god or demons into your belief system.
Look at it another way: if I met god, and asked him what he is made of, how it is that he has his powers and omniscience etc (regardless of whether I could understand the answer), it&#039;s pretty odd to think there wouldn&#039;t be an answer.

A materialistic world-view is to me obvious, and doesn&#039;t automatically contradict or disprove whatever nonsense or woo one may want to believe in. So I think people arguing the opposite are just working with connotations and definitions that differ from reality.

But that&#039;s not to say I&#039;m ok with the position that all of consciousness is just flesh and chemistry. _I_ exist, I am conscious, this is a real thing I experience (or else _I_ would not be experiencing it -I could THINK I was, but I wouldn&#039;t be...if you see the difference, which you can&#039;t - one can only be certain about their own consciousness). I can&#039;t comprehend how this could be explained simply by particles moving around and bouncing into each other. 
However that I can&#039;t comprehend it doesn&#039;t make it so. Nevertheless there are too, too many odd questions to answer, that we haven&#039;t even yet begun to understand how to answer, or even ask, that I can&#039;t be quite as optimistic as Steven seems to be regarding our understanding of consciousness and implication that we&#039;re getting there, on the right track, etc.

I even sometimes feel that anyone who isn&#039;t totally blown away by the questions of consciousness, and is happy to accept it as just some biological side-effect of complex computations, is maybe a P-Zombie, and simply has no experience of consciousness, or at least, not as I experience it.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think it&#8217;s pretty bizarre to assume a non-materialistic world view. Even if you believe in god, ghosts, leprechauns or telepathy.<br />
If god is standing to my left, and a ghost to my right, then something, someTHING, differentiates the space to my left from the space to my right. It may not be a form of matter we can even begin to imagine, but something is different. Nothing is &#8220;supernatural&#8221;. Nothing can exist without existing. And it&#8217;s not necessary, not even to fit god or demons into your belief system.<br />
Look at it another way: if I met god, and asked him what he is made of, how it is that he has his powers and omniscience etc (regardless of whether I could understand the answer), it&#8217;s pretty odd to think there wouldn&#8217;t be an answer.</p>
<p>A materialistic world-view is to me obvious, and doesn&#8217;t automatically contradict or disprove whatever nonsense or woo one may want to believe in. So I think people arguing the opposite are just working with connotations and definitions that differ from reality.</p>
<p>But that&#8217;s not to say I&#8217;m ok with the position that all of consciousness is just flesh and chemistry. _I_ exist, I am conscious, this is a real thing I experience (or else _I_ would not be experiencing it -I could THINK I was, but I wouldn&#8217;t be&#8230;if you see the difference, which you can&#8217;t &#8211; one can only be certain about their own consciousness). I can&#8217;t comprehend how this could be explained simply by particles moving around and bouncing into each other.<br />
However that I can&#8217;t comprehend it doesn&#8217;t make it so. Nevertheless there are too, too many odd questions to answer, that we haven&#8217;t even yet begun to understand how to answer, or even ask, that I can&#8217;t be quite as optimistic as Steven seems to be regarding our understanding of consciousness and implication that we&#8217;re getting there, on the right track, etc.</p>
<p>I even sometimes feel that anyone who isn&#8217;t totally blown away by the questions of consciousness, and is happy to accept it as just some biological side-effect of complex computations, is maybe a P-Zombie, and simply has no experience of consciousness, or at least, not as I experience it.</p>
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		<title>By: Alastair F. Paisley</title>
		<link>http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/what-is-consciousness-another-reply-to-kastrup/comment-page-4/#comment-43686</link>
		<dc:creator>Alastair F. Paisley</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 May 2012 04:40:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=4521#comment-43686</guid>
		<description>@ Steven Novella

&gt; &lt;i&gt;Regarding the question – why are we not zombies, why is there qualia, etc. &lt;b&gt;I don’t think we need an answer to this&lt;/b&gt;. There does not necessarily have to be an evolutionary advantage (that’s hyperadaptationalism). It could just be that vertebrate central nervous systems evolved that way as a solution to having behavior react to and adapt to the environment. Maybe a life form could have evolved to have similarly complex behavior without consciousness, but who cares. That doesn’t mean that consciousness would not evolve.&lt;/i&gt;  &lt;i&gt;I tend to think that consicousness, however, is not separable from the &lt;b&gt;complex&lt;/b&gt; behavior we associate with it. Animals evolved to respond positively and negatively to stimuli. Over time the analysis of that stimuli and the response to it became very &lt;b&gt;complex&lt;/b&gt;, and we experience that partly as our consciousness.&lt;/i&gt; &lt;

The term &quot;complexity&quot; is merely employed as a euphemism for magic. It explains nothing.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@ Steven Novella</p>
<p>&gt; <i>Regarding the question – why are we not zombies, why is there qualia, etc. <b>I don’t think we need an answer to this</b>. There does not necessarily have to be an evolutionary advantage (that’s hyperadaptationalism). It could just be that vertebrate central nervous systems evolved that way as a solution to having behavior react to and adapt to the environment. Maybe a life form could have evolved to have similarly complex behavior without consciousness, but who cares. That doesn’t mean that consciousness would not evolve.</i>  <i>I tend to think that consicousness, however, is not separable from the <b>complex</b> behavior we associate with it. Animals evolved to respond positively and negatively to stimuli. Over time the analysis of that stimuli and the response to it became very <b>complex</b>, and we experience that partly as our consciousness.</i> &lt;</p>
<p>The term &quot;complexity&quot; is merely employed as a euphemism for magic. It explains nothing.</p>
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		<title>By: Alastair F. Paisley</title>
		<link>http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/what-is-consciousness-another-reply-to-kastrup/comment-page-4/#comment-43685</link>
		<dc:creator>Alastair F. Paisley</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 May 2012 04:36:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=4521#comment-43685</guid>
		<description>@ Steven Novella

&gt; &lt;i&gt;Regarding the question – why are we not zombies, why is there qualia, etc. &lt;b&gt;I don’t think we need an answer to this&lt;/b&gt;. There does not necessarily have to be an evolutionary advantage (that’s hyperadaptationalism). 
 It could just be that vertebrate central nervous systems evolved that way as a solution to having behavior react to and adapt to the environment. Maybe a life form could have evolved to have similarly complex behavior without consciousness, but who cares. That doesn’t mean that consciousness would not evolve.&lt;/i&gt;  &lt;i&gt;I tend to think that consicousness, however, is not separable from the &lt;b&gt;complex&lt;/b&gt; behavior we associate with it. Animals evolved to respond positively and negatively to stimuli. Over time the analysis of that stimuli and the response to it became very &lt;b&gt;complex&lt;/b&gt;, and we experience that partly as our consciousness.&lt;/i&gt;  &lt;i&gt;Further, we needed some way to attend to the important part of all the information potentially coming in. How do you attend to some information and ignore other information without having something like consciousness.&lt;/i&gt; &lt;

The problem with materialists like yourself is that they presuppose dualism and refuse to acknowledge it as such. You&#039;re actually presupposing dualism because you&#039;re presupposing free will. This is made evident by your use of the term &quot;attend.&quot;

On the materialist view, consciousness is simply an &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/epiphenomenon&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;epiphenomenon&lt;/a&gt;. As such, it is casually inert and cannot confer any survival benefit. Therefore you cannot furnish us with any plausible explanation why &quot;organic robots WITH consciousness&quot; were naturally selected over &quot;organic robots WITHOUT consciousness.&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@ Steven Novella</p>
<p>&gt; <i>Regarding the question – why are we not zombies, why is there qualia, etc. <b>I don’t think we need an answer to this</b>. There does not necessarily have to be an evolutionary advantage (that’s hyperadaptationalism).<br />
 It could just be that vertebrate central nervous systems evolved that way as a solution to having behavior react to and adapt to the environment. Maybe a life form could have evolved to have similarly complex behavior without consciousness, but who cares. That doesn’t mean that consciousness would not evolve.</i>  <i>I tend to think that consicousness, however, is not separable from the <b>complex</b> behavior we associate with it. Animals evolved to respond positively and negatively to stimuli. Over time the analysis of that stimuli and the response to it became very <b>complex</b>, and we experience that partly as our consciousness.</i>  <i>Further, we needed some way to attend to the important part of all the information potentially coming in. How do you attend to some information and ignore other information without having something like consciousness.</i> &lt;</p>
<p>The problem with materialists like yourself is that they presuppose dualism and refuse to acknowledge it as such. You&#039;re actually presupposing dualism because you&#039;re presupposing free will. This is made evident by your use of the term &quot;attend.&quot;</p>
<p>On the materialist view, consciousness is simply an <a href="http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/epiphenomenon" rel="nofollow">epiphenomenon</a>. As such, it is casually inert and cannot confer any survival benefit. Therefore you cannot furnish us with any plausible explanation why &#8220;organic robots WITH consciousness&#8221; were naturally selected over &#8220;organic robots WITHOUT consciousness.&#8221;</p>
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		<title>By: Eric Thomson</title>
		<link>http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/what-is-consciousness-another-reply-to-kastrup/comment-page-4/#comment-43598</link>
		<dc:creator>Eric Thomson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 25 May 2012 20:11:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=4521#comment-43598</guid>
		<description>Note I haven&#039;t forgotten the requests to do the story above with nonconscious scientists. It is harder than I thought it would be, will post eventually at philosophyofbrains.com if not just my ms. I have half of it written, but the hard half is taking me a long time forcing me to think it through more thoroughly. It will likely take a couple of weeks (minimum) of thinking to get there. 

I do have a day job, after all. :)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Note I haven&#8217;t forgotten the requests to do the story above with nonconscious scientists. It is harder than I thought it would be, will post eventually at philosophyofbrains.com if not just my ms. I have half of it written, but the hard half is taking me a long time forcing me to think it through more thoroughly. It will likely take a couple of weeks (minimum) of thinking to get there. </p>
<p>I do have a day job, after all. <img src='http://theness.com/neurologicablog/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
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		<title>By: BillyJoe7</title>
		<link>http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/what-is-consciousness-another-reply-to-kastrup/comment-page-4/#comment-43575</link>
		<dc:creator>BillyJoe7</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 May 2012 21:45:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=4521#comment-43575</guid>
		<description>sonic,

(I’m messing with you here)–
If there is no difference between life and non-life— then my consciousness will continue beyond my death– right? &quot;

(stop messing with me)-
I said that it is difficult to classify some things are alive or not alive. Are viruses alive? Prions?

If you cannot definitely classify some things that exist now as definitely alive or definitely not alive, then it should not be difficult to see how, at some time in the past, life could have arisen from non-life. At the interface there is not much difference between the two. Non-life could easily have graduated into life. How many different ways do I need to say it?
Yet you always seem to avoid arguing sensibly against this argument.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>sonic,</p>
<p>(I’m messing with you here)–<br />
If there is no difference between life and non-life— then my consciousness will continue beyond my death– right? &#8221;</p>
<p>(stop messing with me)-<br />
I said that it is difficult to classify some things are alive or not alive. Are viruses alive? Prions?</p>
<p>If you cannot definitely classify some things that exist now as definitely alive or definitely not alive, then it should not be difficult to see how, at some time in the past, life could have arisen from non-life. At the interface there is not much difference between the two. Non-life could easily have graduated into life. How many different ways do I need to say it?<br />
Yet you always seem to avoid arguing sensibly against this argument.</p>
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		<title>By: tmac57</title>
		<link>http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/what-is-consciousness-another-reply-to-kastrup/comment-page-4/#comment-43570</link>
		<dc:creator>tmac57</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 May 2012 19:32:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://theness.com/neurologicablog/?p=4521#comment-43570</guid>
		<description>Sonic-Are you troubled by the fact that the unique properties of water,are only available to water?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sonic-Are you troubled by the fact that the unique properties of water,are only available to water?</p>
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