How hard is the ‘hard problem’?

Chalmers places the ‘hard problem’ within ‘the puzzle of conscious experience’. If we agree that the problem of consciousness is basically the problem of ‘I’ having a continuos experience in spite of ‘my’ knowledge/ignorance about the causal connections, the puzzle becomes that of the conscious experiencer rather than of the experience. To the question whether emphasis on conscious experiencer will add anything new to the existing problem, the answer is a firm ‘yes’. The ‘hard problem’ gets harder when it comes to the experiencer who has the conscious experience. Hence the question ‘who is having the conscious experience?’ is more significant than ‘what is it like to have a conscious experience?’ Despite the personal and subjective nature of consciousness a reducibility is possible in the realm of ‘I-consciousness’ which speaks more about its pervasive oneness than pluralistic existence. And also a simple “Theory of Everything” having a set of physical laws and another set of psychophysical laws can eventually explain only the apparent schisms evident in any experience. The problem becomes complex when the relation between the experience and the experiencer is asked for. It is plausible that the Theory of Everything will have to belong to another level of existence, since it has to stand distinct yet abridge physical processes and conscious experiences. An approach to consciousness by way of a non-reductionistic divide of ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ problems is more of physical than phenomenological import. If it is a problem of devising a theory to link the mechanism and its cognitive function, then non-reductionism initiated will have to remain rigid indirectly begging the first question.

I will argue that in an approach favouring three levels of reality such as (i)physical process leading to experience, (ii)experience of having a conscious experience and (iii)fundamental laws linking the former two levels, the ‘hardness’ of consciousness will have to be always backed up by non-subjective theories compartmentalizing the problem of consciousness in three closed linear systems. Functional and operational descriptions of material systems are not readily translatable into properties owing to irreducible complexities. It is known that different complex systems manifest utterly different behavior. To make it more difficult, there cannot be one to one simulation of properties and behaviors at various levels. It is agreed upon by many that we ‘choose’ to see. Manifest properties depend upon the observables we choose to look at. Another difficulty making it harder will be to account for the reversibility of physical processes and conscious experience as Chalmers himself suggests. Can a physical process lead to a conscious experience or can a conscious experience simulate corresponding physical structures? This brings back the ancient puzzle whether the egg or the chicken is first. Hence it will be unbecoming for this neo-reductionistic approach to claim that it will “one day [may] resolve the greatest mystery of the mind”.

Again, here is the link to the entire article.

http://www.infinityfoundation.com/mandala/i_es/i_es_menon_sankar_frameset.htm

“Chalmers outlines the existing responses to this question. Some have tried to explain consciousness with conventional neuroscience, but Chalmers rejects these as just answering the easy problem and not addressing the hard problem. For example, someone may explain our ability to report our feelings, but this is not the same as having the feelings in the first place. Others say that there is something non-physical that causes subjective experience (this would be Egnor’s position). Chalmers specifically rejects such appeals to magic as not actually answering the question and not presenting anything that can be approached either philosophically or scientifically.

Others state that the hard problem is actually a non-problem. (I count myself in this camp.) Specifically, that once you have entirely solved the easy problems of explaining everything consciousness does, you have solved the hard problem by extension. Our subjective sense of existing is an emergent property of all the reducible components of brain function. There is nothing extra. Chalmers rejects this solution.”

I think you have summed this up well. Like Chalmers but for other reasons I also reject this solution. Do you think the ongoing discussion has any room for considering the ideas/experience of the various Vedantins who philosophize about consciousness in various shades of monism/dualism and speak of confirming non falsafiable experience? Then again it may not be unfalsafiabale, but little testing if any has been done on their adepts.

Here is an article suggesting a Vedanta approach to the ‘hard problem’ introduced by David Chalmers. As I read it, it merely suggests that with regard to an important unsolved problem there may be room to think outside the box. I realize that you seem to feel that the problem is practically solved, perhaps as does Dennet. Although you probably also recognize that peers would be quick to disagree and even say that it is far from being solved and even that solutions like those of Dennet are patently absurd (Searle for example, who some say misunderstood Dennet).

At any rate, here is the article, unfortunately dated 2000.

http://www.infinityfoundation.com/mandala/i_es/i_es_menon_sankar_frameset.htm

I appreciate your time and look forward to your reply.

and in the next you say “The idea that mental and physical functioning is, or will be, explained in terms of the physical brain is pure mythology.”

It sounds like you want to have your cake and eat it too. You claim we know to little about the brain to understand it but also seem to claim to know that the things we don’t know are metaphysical. How can we know so little about the brain and be so sure that the parts we don’t understand will lead us to metaphysical explanations. There is a chance you are right, but if we know so little how can we be so sure one way or another? These sentiments are merely opinion at best and illogical contradictions at worst.

I agree – it is not enough to duplicate the pattern of neurons in silicon, you also have to reproduce the function of neurons. Exactly what this means is unclear, and we will probably only figure that out when we try to do it. Also “silicon” is just representative – the ultimate substrate of artificial intelligence may be something else entirely.

Also, exact neural organisation in silicon should fail miserably to represent human neurones because they are fundamentally different materials. Therefore any emergent property will differ by greater degrees the further it is from the material base (ie emergent properties appearing from other emergent properties).